The Complaint Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 6 
1941 
The Complaint Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Complaint Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 252 (1941). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol10/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE
Introduction
In an effort to effect uniformity in federal and state procedure the Con-
formity Act" was adopted in 1872. It provided that in actions at law in the
Federal courts the practice and pleadings should conform to the rules of pro-
cedure then in force in the state where the Federal court was sitting. The
result was that in some states the pleadings were liberally construed while in
others the rule of strict construction was applied to the pleadings2 and the art
of pleading in the various federal courts required a diversity of skill and knowl-
edge commensurate with the diversity of state practice. The uniformity at
which this Act was directed was never realized in its application and in 1934
Congress authorized the Supreme Court to formulate rules of procedure for the
District Courts.3 The purpose and scope of pleading under these Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure have been expressed in many diverse ways4 but the theme of
each expression is keynoted by such terms as "efficiency", "simplicity", "ex-
pedition of the business of the court" and "to do substantial justice rather
than decide cases upon the technicalities." 5 From these expressions it is evident
that the effort of the formulators of the Code was directed toward an oblitera-
tion of the particularistic and archaic rules governing Common Law pleading
and "judicially interpreted" Code pleading. The requirements necessary for a
good complaint have been generally liberalized. But the provisions of the Rules
are so broad that the ultimate determination of what requisites the pleader in
a Federal court must fulfill rests with the judiciary and the determination will be
strict or liberal, depending upon how far the judge will follow the spirit of the
Rules of Procedure.6
1. 28 U. S. C. A. § 724. Proceedings in Equity were specifically excluded from the
operation of this Act and they were subsequently controlled by the Equity Rules, 28
U. S. C. A. following § 723 (1912). Both suits at law and proceedings in Equity are now
controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Many other points of conflict were existent by virtue of the elasticity of the Con-
formity Act and the fact that its application was discretionary in certain instances. See
Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 74 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); Perry v.
Standard Oil Co., 15 F. Supp. 563 (S. D. Miss. 1936); Isberian v. Mourad, 83 F. (2d)
728 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; In re East Contra Costa Dist., 10 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Calif. 1935).
3. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. (1934) § 723 (b).
4. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (1935) 44 YATX L. J. 387, 1291;
Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1939) 25 VA. L. Rav. 261; Clark, The Bar
and Recent Reform of Federal Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 22; Wheaton, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted (1939) 25 CoRN. L. Q. 28; Giesy v. American Nat.
Bank, 31 F. Supp. 524 (D. C. Ore. 1940); Wheeler v. Lientz, 25 F. Supp. 939 (W. D.
Mo. 1939); Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 24 F. Supp. 731 (E. D. Tex. 1938); 1 MooaE,
Fanmmb PRACTicE (1938) iii.
5. FED. RuLEs Cxv. PROC. 1, 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c) states the purpose
of the rules as: "They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."
6. Dean Charles E. Clark, a member of the Advisory Committee which formulated the
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Form of Complaint
Rule 8 provides that a pleading7 shall contain: "(1) A short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends .... "
The original jurisdiction of the Federal courts is a limited one8 and it is there-
fore necessary for a party who seeks to invoke that jurisdiction to show the
court upon what grounds the jurisdiction rests. He must show in his pleadings,
"affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential to federal
jurisdiction." 9 Where the plaintiff seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship an allegation that "he is a citizen of
a certain state and domiciled therein" sufficiently sets forth the ultimate fact
of citizenship.'0 Where it is necessary to allege the existence of a jurisdictional
amount, an allegation that the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of in-
terests and costs, the sum of $3,000 is sufficient." The sum claimed by the
plaintiff is controlling if the claim is made in good faith, unless it appears to a
legal certainty that the claim is really less than the jurisdictional amount. In
such event the court will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.' 2 However, while the
rules require only a short statement of jurisdiction and the construction of the
allegations is liberal, it is sometimes necessary to plead the jurisdictional facts
in greater detail in order to bring the case within the limited scope of the federal
court's jurisdiction.'3 The requirement of pleading the basis of jurisdiction is
rules pointed out the dangers of a "legalistic approach" to the rules. Clark, The Bar and
Recent Reform of Federal Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 22, 23; Dobie, The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1939) 25 VA. L. R-v. 261; Ford, More Expeditious Determination
of Actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 223. See Tahir
Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 F. (2d) 865, 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941); Securities Ex-
change Comm. v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 41 (N. D. Calif. 1939).
7. This includes any pleading which is a claim for relief whether it is an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim. Fai>. Rums Civ. PRoc. 8 (a), 28 U. S.
C. A. following § 723 (c). But note that where a counterclaim necessarily arises out
of the same transaction as that sued upon by the plaintiff it is not necessary to allege
any grounds for federal jurisdiction.
8. 28 U. S. C. A. § 41. This statute sets forth the particular grounds of the juris-
diction of a Federal District Court.
9. Gates v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 31 F. Supp. 854 (D. C. Neb. 1940).
10. Watters v. Ralston Coal Co., 25 F. Supp. 387 (M. D. Pa. 1940). An allegation of
residence is not essential but an allegation of residence alone, without setting forth cfti-
zenship, is insufficient. Fowler v. Baker, 32 F. Supp. 783 (M. D. Pa. 1940). See FED.
RuLas CIv. PRoc., Official Form, No. 2.
11. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 27 F. Supp. 735 (E. D. N. Y. 1939);
Sun Oil Co. v. Pfeiffer, 1 F. R. D. 119 (W. D. Okla. 1939). See FED. Ru-Es Civ. PRoc.,
Official Form, No. 2.
12. Sparks v. England, 113 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
13. In a class suit where the plaintiff seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court
on the grounds of diversity of citizenship he must show that he is the representative of
a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court and
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essential and if the complaint contains no allegation of jurisdictional facts as
required by Rule 8a (1), and the defendant does not raise the issue or urge
the lack of jurisdiction, the court will consider the issue of its own accord.1 4
But such a defect is not fatal. The rules permit liberal amendment and where
the allegations in a complaint do not sufficiently show jurisdiction it may be
amended.' 5
The second provision of Rule 8 (a) provides that a complaint shall contain:
"(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
titled to relief. . . . " It has generally been conceded that the intent of this
subdivision is that any plain statement which shows in simple, concise and direct
averments, that the pleader is entitled to relief, is sufficient to fulfill the require-
ments of this section.16 The Rules relegate to oblivion the technical forms of
pleading17 and substitute in their place brief, clear and simple statements of
the essential elements upon which the claim rests.i s
that the suit by the plaintiff will insure an adequate representation of all the persons and
that the right sought to be enforced is joint or common to all. Moreschi v. Mosteller,
28 F. Supp. 613 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
Where the defendant was engaged in "commerce" an allegation that plaintiffs were em-
ployed by defendant is not sufficient to show that they were engaged in "commerce" so
as to bring them within the provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act. It was
necessary for them to further allege that they were engaged in manufacturing, processing
or handling goods in commerce. Gates v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 31 F. Supp. 854 (D. C.
Neb. 1940).
14. Bender v. Connor, 28 F. Supp. 903 (D. C. Conn. 1939).
15. Horne v. Hammond Co., 155 U. S. 393 (1894); Betzoldt v. American Ins. Co.,
47 Fed. 705 (E. D. Mich. 1891); Moreschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
In Radio Wire Co. v. Bartniew, (S. D. N. Y.-Opinion $12,726) where the plaintiff sought
to compel the transfer of stock on a corporation's books, the court held that the allegation
of jurisdictional amount was insufficient and that it "may not permit amendment". The
court states that the case of McEldowney v. Card, 193 Fed. 475 (E. D. Tenn. 1911) is
not contra. And yet the court in that case, at page 483, said: "The authority of the trial
court to permit, in the exercise of its discretion, amendments to the pleadings making
necessary jurisdictional averments . ..is well settled." In the Radio Wire case the court
distinguishes the latter case by stating that the "court had jurisdiction as a fact to its
own knowledge .. . ", but it is to be noted that the court in the McEldowney case ex-
pressly said that "this defect in the pleadings is not supplied by any other portion of the
record."
16. Sierocinski v. E. I. DuPont & Co., 103 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939); Securities
& Exchange Comm. v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Calif. 1939); Tahir Erk
v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 4th, 194-1); Ford, Federal Rudes of
Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315, 317.
17. Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 F. (2d) 865, 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
18. In Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, 28 F. Supp. 737 (M. D. Pa. 1939) the Court said:
"Under liberal construction of these rules to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim
on which relief may be had, it is necessary only" to allege sufficient facts to apprise the
opposing party of the nature of the claim which will be proved and technicalities in
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The third subdivision of Rule 8 (a) provides that the complaint shall contain:
"(3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he (the plaintiff) deems
himself entitled." Under this subdivision either legal or equitable relief may
be demanded in the alternative or different forms of relief may be demanded
cumulatively.' 9 This requirement of pleading a demand for judgment, while it
is not part of the plaintiff's claim for relief, is essential. However, the plaintiffs'
recovery is not limited to the nature of the relief demanded. He may obtain
any form of relief to which he is entitled on the basis of the facts proven at the
trial even though he has not demanded such relief. 20 Thus, recovery is had,
not on the basis of the plaintiff's allegations of damages or his theory of
damages, but on the basis of facts shown at the trial and relief should be denied
only when the plaintiff is entitled to none under the facts proved.2 '
Under the Federal Rules a complaint need not be verified by the party or by
the attorney unless the action is brought under a statute which requires the
pleadings therein to be verified. 22 However, every complaint must be signed by
an attorney of record who is held to strict accountability and such signing consti-
tutes a certification by him that: " . . . he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay."' 3
Claim for Relief
"The modern philosophy concerning pleadings is that they do little more
than indicate generally the type of litigation that is involved. A generalized
summary of the case that affords fair notice is all that is required.1 24 This
pleading are no longer observed."
See also FED. RULES Civ. PROC., Official Forms, Nos. 3-18. The purpose of these forms
is merely to indicate the simplicity and conciseness which is desired by the Rules and the
mere fact that they are copied will not bar a dismissal of a complaint for insufficiency.
Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S. D. Calif. 1938).
A more detailed discussion of the requirements of Rule 8a (2) will be found infra pp.
255-267.
19. Catanzaritti v. Bianco, 25 F. Supp. 457 (M. D. Pa. 1938); 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAc-
TrcE (1938) 457.
20. Nester v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Calif. 1938) aff'd 106
F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Catanzaritti v. Bianco, 25 F. Supp. 457 (M. D. Pa.
1938); Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 264.
But where a judgment is entered by default the plaintiff is not entitled to niy relief
different from that which is asked for in the demand for judgment. FED. RULES CIV.
PRoc. 54 (c), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c). See Dobie, The Federal Redes of Civil
Procedure (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 264, n. 11.
21. Nester v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Calif. 1938), aff'd 106
F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 309 U. S. 582 (1940).
22. FED. RULES Civ. PRoc. 11, 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c).
23. FED. RULES Crv. PROC. 11, 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c); Poster Wheeler
Corp. v. American Surety Co., 25 F. Supp. 225 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
24. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 41 (N. D. Calif.
1939).
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view, adopted by the Federal Rules,25 contemplates liberality in the construction
of a plaintiff's claim for relief. And commendably following the spirit of the
rules the courts have not been disposed to disapprove a pleading on any tech-
nical bases.26 They have dealt with the substance and not with the form in
construing a complaint.
2 7
1. Sufficiency of Complaint
As a general rule the Federal courts have attempted to examine the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's claim, not in the light of past adjudications, but engendered
with the enlightened spirit of the Federal Rules, they have adopted a new ap-
proach to their examination. Many cases have weighed the sufficiency of
claims for relief and while it is true that some cases seem to disregard the new
liberality in construction, the vast majority of them have adhered to the trend
of simplicity which the Federal Rules seek to effectuate. An examination of
some of these cases will serve to indicate the courts' adherence to the policy
of simplicity.
In an action for personal injury where the plaintiff alleged as negligent acts
the manufacturing and distributing of a dynamite cap "in such a fashion that
it was unable to stand the crimping which defendant knew it would be subjected
to," the defendant argued that it was not put on notice by the complaint
whether it was to meet a claim of warranty, misrepresentation, or of faulty
construction. The court denied a motion to dismiss for insufficiency and held
the complaint to be sufficient even though it did not set forth any specific act
of negligence.2 8 It has also been held that a mere general charge of negligence,
without specification in the claim, in a negligence action was sufficient.29
Where an action was brought against the defendants for violations of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the charges alleged extended over a period of two
years the court denied many requests of the defendant contained in his motion
to make more definite and certain under Rule 12 (e) .3 The court said:
"Necessarily in applying Rule 12 (e) the court must take into consideration
the nature and complexity of the suit. Preparation of the proper pleading for
trial in this suit requires a statement of matters and their relation to each
other far more extensive from that in a simple pleading on contract or in
negligence. The court has been conscious of this. It has sought to be liberal
25. FED. RuLEs Crv. PRoc. 8 (f), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c) provides: "All
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
26. Neumann v. Faultless Clothing Co., 27 F. Supp. 810 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Gray
v. Schoonmaker, 30 F. Supp. 1019 (N. D. Ill. 1940).
27. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Calif. 1939).
28. Sierocinski v. E. I. Du Pont & Co., 103 F.'(2d) 843 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939). The
District Court had granted the motion to dismiss.
29. Hardin v. Interstate Motor Freight System, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 97 (S. D. Ohio 1939).
30. United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 205 (W. . N. Y. 1940).
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in acting upon the demands. Defendants however, have ample opportunity,
under other provisions of the rules, to procure information as to many matters
concerning ... their demands." 31 In another action brought for violation of the
Sherman Act, the court in dismissing the complaint for insufficiency said: "Plain-
tiff, in a very general manner alleges 'that the defendant exhibitors have com-
bined with each other ...to unreasonably restrain interstate trade and com-
merce in motion picture films and to monopolize and attempt to monopolize the
first and second run exhibition of feature run pictures ... in violation of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in the following manner.' Then follows
allegations with respect to the manner in which these were made and carried
into effect. But these allegations are of a general nature and the violations
alleged are more conclusions of the pleader than statements of fact."32 The
court tested the sufficiency of the complaint by determining whether it stated
a "cause of action?' 33 and seemed to overlook the theory established by the
new rules with respect to the function of a pleading. The purpose and scope
of pleadings under the Rules is merely to give notice30 4 to the adverse party of
the nature of the "claim for relief" and to give him sufficient information to
prepare a responsive pleading.3 5 The mere fact that the allegations are genera 3 6
31. Id. at 208.
32. United States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 1 F. R. D. 229, 230 (W. D. Okla. 1946).
33. The words "cause of action" were deliberately omitted from the provisions of
Rule 8a (2) because by the process of judicial interpretation they have come to represent
that fine detail and particularity in pleading which the formulators of the Rules were seek-
ing to avoid and an examination of the complaint upon this basis can well be criticized.
See White v. Holland Furnace Co., 31 F. Supp. 32 (S. D. Ohio 1939); Wright v. Brush,
115 F. (2d) 265, 268 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
34. "The whole theory with respect to the function of pleadings is changed. Under
the Equity practice the function was to plead facts and frame the issues. Under the new
rules the purpose of the pleading is to give notice of what an adverse party may expect
to meet." Montgomery, Changes in Federal Practice (1940) 1 F. R. D. 337, 339. See
also Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, 28 F. Supp. 737 (M. D. Pa. 1939); Sunderland, The New
Federal Rules (1938) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5. Pike and Willis, Federal Deposition-Discovery
Procedure (1939) 38 COL. L. Rev. 1179 sets forth the theory in these words: "The new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not proceed upon the assumption that the function
of pleading is to prepare the case for trial. It is recognized that the 'issue pleading' of
the common law does not sift out the real issues, the 'fact pleading' of the codes the real
facts. The generality of allegations contemplated by the new rules indicates the influence
of the newer concept of 'notice pleading': the object of the complaint is to indicate to the
defendant which grievance is being pressed." This theory of notice pleading, while it
has not been rejected, has been modified to the extent that pleading under the Rules con-
stitutes something more than mere notice and yet something less than fact pleading. See
Johnson v. Occidental Ins. Co., 1 F. R. D. 554 (D. C. Minn. 1941); Ford, The Federal
Riles of Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315, 316; 1 MooaE, FEDEwm PRacrzcz (1938) 548.
35. Marcus v. Hess, 1 F. R. D. 282 (W. D. Pa. 1940).
36. In construing a complaint the Supreme Court said: "While these allegations are
general we cannot say they are inadequate." Stevens v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 311 U. S.
255 (1940). See Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
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or that the pleader has set forth conclusions3 7 should not defeat a claim for
relief upon a motion to dismiss for insufficiency or subject the complaint to a
motion to make more definite and certain unless it does not reasonably apprise
the defendant of the nature of the claim.
Where plaintiff brought an action on the theory of restitution alleging that,
"defendant became indebted to plaintiff upon an implied contract for the
exclusive use of the photograph and name of plaintiff's steer, 'Big Jim', in the
advertising of defendant's animal food products" the court held that there was
no fact stated which would support the conclusion of "implied contract" to
pay.3 8 Plaintiff had copied his complaint from the official forms39 and it would
seem that the allegations, while they are conclusions, are within the scope of the
spirit of the Rules and are sufficient to put the adverse party on notice of the
nature of the claim against him. However the granting of the motion to dis-
miss may, perhaps, be justified upon the basis that the complaint did not allege
any facts but consisted solely of a conclusion of law.40
In an action on an employment contract where the plaintiff alleged the con-
tract, the terms thereof, the amount of compensation agreed upon, and per-
formance, the court held the complaint to be sufficient even though plaintiff
failed to allege the sales made or to otherwise show that the commissions sued
for were earned. 41
Evidence from the circuit court of appeal indicates even more strongly and
authoritatively the courts' determination to adhere to the liberal spirit of the
Rules. In every case, except on&, the lower courts had dismissed the complaint
for insufficiency and in each case the action was reversed and the complaint
held sufficient by the circuit courts. In Sparks v. England the court, in sus-
taining the sufficiency of a complaint, set forth the basic principles which
should govern the determination of whether the complaint sufficiently states
a "claim for relief." The court said: "The Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require that a plaintiff shall plead every fact essential to recover the amount
which he claims. The requirement is, 'a short and plain statement of the claim
37. Whether or not conclusions of the pleader would satisfy the requirements of a
complaint under the new rules was one of the most controversial points before the form-
ulators of the Rules. And since the adoption of the Rules some of the district courts
have permitted them to be pleaded and others have rejected them. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAc'rmCn (1938) 546-553; Ford, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315-
317; Sunderland, The New Federal Rides (1938) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5, 12; Brogdex Co. v.
Food Machinery Corp., 29 F. Supp. 698 (D. C. Del. 1939); Zimmerman v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 30 F. Supp. 438 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Lewis v. United States, 27 F. Supp.
894 (E. D. Tenn. 1939); McLeod v. Cohen-Erichs Corp., 28 F. Supp. 103 (S. D. N. Y.
1939).
38. Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S. D. Calif. 1938).
39. See note 16 supra.
40. Ford, Federal Rides of Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315, 316.
41. Neumann v. 'Faultless Clothing Co., 27 F. Supp. 810 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
42. 113 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. .. ' The appendix of forms
accompanying the rules illustrates how simply a claim may be pleaded and
with how few factual averments. This court has consistently disapproved of
the practice of terminating litigation, believed to be without merit, by the dis-
missal of complaints for informality or insufficiency. If it is conceivable that,
under the allegations of his complaint, a plaintiff can, upon a trial, establish a
case which would entitle him to the relief prayed for, a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of statement ought not to be granted." 43 Tahir Erk v. Glenn L.
Martin Co.,44 represents, perhaps, an outpost in the expression of liberality
beyond which the courts will not go in construing the Federal Rules of Pro-
cedure. In upholding the sufficiency of the complaint and reversing the Federal
district court's decision to dismiss, the court said, ". . . we do not intend to
indicate that the instant complaint should be used as a future model. We
clearly recognize the indefiniteness of the various allegations stated therein,
but . . . we feel that our actions are controlled by both the letter and spirit
of the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure. .. 1.45 In Simmons v. Peavey-
Welsh1,46 the circuit court sustained the district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint. The decision does not, however, represent any departure from the
liberal trend of the circuit courts. Plaintiff sued on contract and the allegations
of the complaint, which were numerous and complex, were supplemented by
many attached exhibits which clearly showed the absence of any ,contract be-
tween the parties. The complaint itself stated a claim for relief but the exhibits
attached thereto, which are controlling, expressly negatived the assertion of
the existence of a contract.
47
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules it appears that the sufficiency of
only one complaint has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. That Court,
like the circuit courts, has not failed to indicate that liberality in the con-
struction of pleadings is the order of the day. In Stevens v. Foster & Kleiser
Company,48 where the complaint alleged "a conspiracy to drive billposting
companies out of business by monopolizing advertising sites and controlling
trade in posters in violation of Section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act", the
Court held that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief despite the
generality of the allegations and the plaintiff's failure to aver that it was unable
to obtain posters elsewhere. The language of the Court was: "While these
43. Id. at 581.
44. 116 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
45. Id. at 870.
46. 113 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
47. It might be further noted that this complaint, although filed before the effective
date of the Rules of Procedure, was tested under the Rules and it might have been sub-
ject to a motion to strike since it violated the requirement that a pleading be simple,
concise and direct. See Chambers v. Cameron, 29 F. Supp. 742 (N. D. Ill. 1939); Michel-
son v. Shell Union Oil Corp., 26 F. Supp. 594 (D. C. Mass. 1939).
48. 311 U. S. 255 (1940).
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allegations are general we cannot say they are inadequate. '49
From the cases it is evident that the effect of the rules, in purpose and
application, was to eliminate the technical requirements for a good complaint
and substitute in their place liberal provisions requiring brevity, clarity and
simplicity in statement of a claim. A valid and just claim is no longer defeated
at the outset for a mere defect in pleading. "The philosophy which the rules
seek to inculcate seems to be that the ends of justice may be attained more
surely and more expeditiously by directing principal attention to the realities
and by giving less consideration to mere formalities." 50
2. Separation of Claims
In accord with the abandonment of technicality, the provisions of the Federal
Rules relative to the separate statement of claims for relief are more liberal
than similar provisions of the most advanced Code states.51 Rule 10 (b) pro-
vides that: (1) there shall be a separate statement, in numbered paragraphs,
of each set of circumstances which constitute an averment in the claim; and
that (2) there shall be a separate count for each claim founded upon a separate
transaction or occurrence. These requirements are similar to those in force in
the various Code states but they are subject to a further qualification which
completely distinguishes them from the rigid, absolute provisions for separate
statement in the state Codes. The rule further provides, by way of qualifica-
tion, that the contents of each averment or paragraph shall be limited to a
statement of a single set of circumstances, "as far as practicable." 52 The other
qualification, which refers to the separate statement of claims, provides for a
separation "whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the
matters set forth." 53 The purpose of this provision is to clarify the pleadings
so that the position of the pleader is clear. Separate paragraphing is mandatory
and each paragraph must contain a single set of circumstances which support
the allegation unless this is not "practicable. '54 Several cases have required
separate* claims to be separately stated and numbered55 but in each case the
pleadings were confusing and the direction to separately state served to effec-
49. Id. at 261.
50. Ford, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315, 318.
51. Cf. N. Y. RULES Civ. PRAC. 90; N. I. PRAc. ACr RurLEs 17, 36; CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1930) § 5513.
52. FED. RuLEs CIV. PRoc. 10 (b), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c).
53. Ibid.
54. One writer has stated that "separate paragraphing is required only as far as is
practicable." 1 MOORE, FEDERAl. PRACTrcE (1938) 605. But it would seem that separate
paragraphing was mandatory and the qualification applies only as to stating a single set
of circumstances in the same allegation.
55. Ingenuities Corp. v. Trau, 1 F. R. D. 578 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Bicknell v. Loyd-
Smith, 25 F. Supp. 657 (E. D. N. Y. 1938); Dellefield v Blockdel Realty Co., 1 F. R. D.
42 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Parts Mfg. Corp. v. Weinberg, I F. R. D. 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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tuate the purpose of the rule. The court will order the claims to be separately
stated and numbered only when it will serve to clarify the issues and to facil-
itate a clear presentation and understanding of the matter set forth.6
3. Facts to be Pleaded
In phrasing Rule 8 (a) the formulators departed from the usual wording
of the codes adopted by the states. The rule provides for a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Unlike
the provisions of most practice codes57 there is lacking such terms as "cause
of action" and 'ultimate facts." The words "cause of action" have, by judicial
interpretation, come to represent certain technical standards and requirements
which the formulators of the rules sought to avoid and it was to release the
claim from this cincture of technicality surrounding statements of causes of
action that the words were omitted from the phraseology of the rule.58 The
incorporation of such phrases as "ultimate facts", "material facts" and "sub-
stantial facts" into the practice codes of the states gave rise to innumerable
fine distinctions between evidentiary facts, ultimate or operative facts and
conclusions of law.59 Such phraseology was wisely omitted from the applicable
provisions of the Federal Rules since it represented certain standards of
particularity and technicality 6 which it was the avowed purpose of the formu-
lators to avoid.61
The failure of the rules to expressly require a statement of "facts" has been
criticized upon the premise that by omitting the requirement of stating ultimate
facts upon which relief should be granted, the new rules "imply that the factual
element heretofore regarded as essential to the statement of a cause of action
has been discarded and under the new rules is not a material factor in the
test of a good pleading." 62 It should not be concluded, however, that there
56. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 113 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940); 1 MOORE, FEDEAL PRACTiCE (1938) 607. Where a cause of action is alleged
and different statements in the complaint are set forth in separate paragraphs as separate
grounds therefor, separate counts are not required. Cowen v. Braun, 1 F. R. D. 43 (S. D.
Iowa 1938); Grauman v. City of New York, 31 F. Supp. 172 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
57. IND. STAT. AxN. (Bums, 1933) § 2-1004; Omio Gn. CoD ANN. (Page, 1926)
§ 11305; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 104-7-2; CA=F. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1935)
§ 426; Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) § 764.
58. White v. Holland Furnace Co., 31 F. Supp. 32 (S. D. Ohio 1939).
59. Cook, Statements of Fact in Code Pleading (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 416.
60. Id. at 423.
61. "What have been thought to be the objects of pleading-the narrowing of issues,
the revelation of facts-will be served by several devices moie precisely adapted to their
fulfillment: .. ." Pike and Willis, Federal Deposition--Dscovery Procedure (1939) 38 CoL.
L. Rnv. 1179. The broad scope of the discovery procedure provided by the federal rules
presents the lawyer with a wide access to all the facts necessary to a proper preparation
for trial and eliminates the necessity for encumbering the pleadings with such facts.
62. Ford, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315. See Edmunds, The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) 4 JoHNq MnsnArS L. Q. 291.
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is to be no factual element required in the statement of a claim under these
rules. The courts have consistently required statements of fact in the claim
and have ruled out conclusions of law and evidentiary facts as improper vehicles
for the purpose of alleging a claim for relief . 3 In Lewis v. United States, the
court said: "Under settled rules applicable to pleadings, the petition must con-
tain a statement of facts, as distinguished from mere conclusions of the pleader,
which show the existence of a cause of action."6' In other cases the courts
have held that the mere fact that the allegations are conclusions of law does
not subject them to a motion to strike.65 Such rulings are in accord with the
views of many of the authorities0 6 and it would seem that allegations in a
complaint based on conclusions rather than facts should be sufficient. It has
been said that "it will be unfortunate if the courts interpret the new rule as
limiting the vehicles which one may use to state causes of action. . . . Facts,
both final and evidentiary, and legal statements should be available for the
task."67
As a general rule the courts have not required evidentiary facts to be pleaded
in an effort to particularize the claim and in some cases they have expressly
disapproved of such allegations and have stricken them from the complaint
on motion.68  However, the fact that a complaint violates the rules as to
63. Holland v. Majestic Radio & Television Corp., 27 F. Supp. 990 (S. D. N. Y. 1939);
Purdue v. United Gas Public Service Co., 28 F. Supp. 847 (W. D. La. 1939); McCampbell
v. Warrich Corp., 109 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Abouaf v. Spreckels Co.,
26 F. Supp. 830 (N. D. Calif. 1939); Lewis v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 894 (E. D.
Tenn. 1939); Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 1 F. R. D. 101 (S. D. N. Y. 1940);
Engler v. General Electric Co., 32 F. Supp. 913 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
64. 27 F. Supp. 894 (E. D. Tenn. 1939).
65. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1 F. R. D. 548 (N. D. Ill. 1941); French
v. French Paper Co., 1 F. R. D. 531 (W. D. Mich. 1941); Samuel Goldwyn Inc. v. United
Artists Corp., 35 F. Supp. 633 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Cater Construction Co., Inc. v. Misch-
witz, 111 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). In Brogdex Co. v. Food Machinery Corp.,
29 F. Supp. 698 (D. C. Del. 1939), the court permitted conclusions of law to be pleaded
since they showed the relation of the facts to one another and since they were so combined
with the facts as to render their separation impractical.
66. Professor Sunderland, a member of the Advisory Committee which formulated the
Rules says: "The real test of a good pleading under the new rules is not . . . whether the
allegations would be deemed good at common law. The test is whether information is
given sufficient to enable the party to prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the
purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information." Sunder-
land, The New Federal Rides (1938) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5, 12. See Ford, Federal Rides of
Civil Procedure (1940) 1 F. R. D. 315-317, where it is said that because "the statement
or averment includes a conclusion of law is no grounds for a motion to strike. . . ." See
also Wheaton, The Federal Rides Interpreted (1939) 25 CORN. L. Q. 28, 35.
67. Wheaton, The Federal Rules Interpreted (1939) 25 CoRN. L. Q. 28, 35.
68. Cater Construction Co. v. Mischwitz, 111 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940);
Sierocinski v. E. I. Du Pont & Co., 103 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. .3d, 1939); Shultz v.
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co., 1 F. R. D. 53 (W. D. N. Y. 1939); Adams v.
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simplicity of statement by setting forth much evidentiary matter does not make
the entire pleading subject to a motion to strike where the allegations necessary
to authorize relief are present. 69
The rules require simple, direct and concise statements of a claim and it
would seem that where irrelevant and immaterial matter was alleged it would
violate this provision of the rules.70 The courts have stricken such matter
from the complaint on motion upon that basis.7 ' But it is also true that the
purpose of the rules is to expedite the trials of actions and if the complaint
is subject to a motion to strike immaterial matter in all cases that will only
serve to delay the action. Immaterial matter should be the subject of a motion
to strike only where it is harmful to the adverse party or where it affects the
substance of the claim.72 In Westmoreland v. Johns-Manville Corp.,7 3 the
court enunciated the rule that: "The mere presence of redundant and imma-
terial matter, not affecting the substance, is not in itself sufficient grounds for
granting a motion to strike such matter from the complaint. Further, that
where no harm will result from immaterial matter not affecting the substance
the court should hesitate to disturb a pleading." T7 4 "
4. Pleading Special Matters
Rule 9 of the Federal Rules enumerates seven matters which must be
specially pleaded.
Capacity:75 A party is not obliged to specifically allege his capacity to sue.
Where a party is suing in a representative capacity it is good practice to indi-
cate in the title of the action in what capacity he is suing, but it is no longer
necessary for him to specifically allege such capacity. If the defendant wishes
to raise the issue of capacity he must do so by a specific averment which shall
affirmatively attack the plaintiff's right to sue.70 An exception to this rule
Hendel, 28 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Universal
Service Ass'n, 106 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
69. Myers v. Beckman, 1 F. R. D. 99 (E. D. Okla. 1940).
70. FED. RFLES Civ. PRoc. 12 (f) provides that a party may move to strike redundant,
immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter from any pleading or the court may strike
it on its own initiative.
71. Engler v. General Electric Co., 32 F. Supp. 913 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Jablow v.
Agnew, 30 F. Supp. 718 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Dellefield v. Blockdel Realty Co., 1 F. R. D.
42 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
72. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) ; Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N. D. Calif. 1939) ;
Meek v. Miller, I F. R. D. 162 (M. D. Pa. 1940); Kraus v. General Motors Corp., 27 F.
Supp. 537 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
73. 30 F. Supp. 389 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
74. Id. at 392.
75. Rule 9 (a).
76. This is different than the practice in most code states where it is necessary to
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exists, however, where it is necessary to allege capacity as the basis of juris-
diction.77
Fraud, Mistake, Condition of Mind:78 Where a complaint alleges fraud or
mistake the pleader must state with particularity the circumstances which
constitute the fraud or mistake.1 9 However, where a general allegation of fraud
is made it will be sufficient if the other parts of the complaint show acts alleged
to constitute fraud. 0 Where it is necessary to show the condition of mind
of a person it is sufficient to plead such conditions of mind as malice, intent
and knowledge by general allegations. And thus, while it is well established
that fraud may not be alleged generally, the intent to defraud need not be
specifically averred but a general allegation will be sufficient.81
Conditions Precedent:82 The provision which controls the pleading of con-
ditions precedent is similar to that governing allegations of capacity. It is
sufficient to generally allege, without specification, the performance or occur-
rence of conditions precedent.83 If the adverse party wishes to challenge the
allege capacity but there is no burden of proving the capacity unless the defendant denies
the allegation. See N. Y. RuL s Civ. PRAc. 93; MUNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9271; ARIz.
RaV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3743; IowA CODE (1935) § 11207; Wis. STAT.
(1939) § 328.31.
77. A corporation must allege the state of incorporation where the jurisdiction of the
action is based on diversity of citizenship between the parties. Marshall v. B. & 0. R.R.
Co., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853). A suit against the Federal Government can be main-
tained only by permission of the United States, and then only in the manner and under
the restrictions presented by the enabling statute. Capacity to sue in such a case is a
jurisdictional fact and must be specifically alleged. Jewel v. United States, 27 F. Supp.
836 (W. . Ky. 1939).
78. Fa. Ru-as Cirv. PRoc. 9 (b), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c).
79. Shultz v. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co., 1 F. R. D. 53 (W. D. N. Y. 1939);
McCarthy v. Schumacher, 1 F. R. D. 8 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Zimmerman v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 30 F. Supp. 438 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Herman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
108 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Putinsky v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 1 F. R. D.
440 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Brown v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 1 F. R. D. 450 (S. D. N. Y.
1940). See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicc (1938) 586-589.
80. E. I. Du Pont v. Du Pont Textile Mills, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 236 (M. D. Pa. 1939).
81. In Love v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 481 (S. D. Miss. 1939), the
court held that a general charge that a letter was maliciously written without alleging
further facts showing malice was sufficient.
82. FED. RoLEs CIV. PROC. 9 (c), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c). Cf. Mvi.IN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 9273; N. D. Com. LAws ANx. (1913) § 7461; WAsH. Rv. STAT. Awm.
(Remington, Supp. 1934) § 288; CAL. CODE Cxv. PRoc. (Deering, 1935) § 457; KAN. GM.
STAT. AwN. (Corrick, 1935) § 60-743; N. Y. Ruxas Crv. PRAc. 92. Under these code
provisions the party must plead "due" performance of the conditions precedent while this
requirement was omitted from Rule 9 (c) of the federal rules.
83. Where plaintiff failed to allege performance of conditions precedent and sought to
remedy the defect by affidavit the court said: "The rules even construed most liberally
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allegation he must do so specifically and with particularity.84 The conditions
precedent referred to in this rule are the conditions going to create liability
or those which construct a legal capacity to sue, and it does not require any
allegation that procedural requirements have been fulfilled.85
Official Document or Act: "In pleading an official document or act it is
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance
with the law."8 6
Judgment:87 Where plaintiff seeks to plead a foreign or domestic judgment
or decision it is sufficient to allege such judgment without showing that the
court from which it issued had jurisdiction to render it. The rule applies to a
"judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer . . ." and there-
fore the rulings of administrative boards may be pleaded in the same manner
as the judgment of a court.
Time and Place:88 The provisions of the rules relative to allegations of time
and place operate to make all such averments material matters for the purpose
of testing the sufficiency of the complaint.8 9 Such allegations were generally
immaterial at common law except where they were, in fact, essential elements
of a plaintiff's cause of action and in such case the failure to properly allege
the time or place precluded a party from introducing evidence of a different
character at the trial. Under the federal rules all such averments are material
but the harsh result at common law has been abrogated by the principle of
liberal amendment adopted by the rules.90
Special Damages: The rules recognize the distinction between general and
special damages. Rule 9 (g) provides: "When items of special damage are
claimed, they shall be specifically stated."91
Contributory Negligence: The matter of pleading and proving contributory
negligence is not one of the elements which must be specially pleaded within
do not permit such looseness of procedure." Landau v. Wolverine Hotel Co., 23 F. Supp.
705 (N. D. I1. 1940).
84. United States v. R. L. Dixon & Bro., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 147 (N. D. Tex. 1940).
85. Snyder v. Le Roy Dal Co., Inc., 1 F. R. D. 362 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
86. FED. RurLEs Civ. PRoc. 9 (d), 28 U. S. C A. following § 723 (c).
87. FED. RULES CIV. PROC. 9 (e), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c).
88. FED. RuLEs CIv. PROC. 9 (f), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723 (c).
89. In Miller Co. v. Hyman, 28 F. Supp. 312 (E. D. Pa. 1939), the court granted the
defendant's motion for a more specific statement of a claim, stating that: "It is a funda-
mental rule of pleading that dates of the expenditure of monies claimed to be recoverable
from the defendant or of a doing of work for the cost of which the defendant is charged
to be liable be furnished in the plaintiff's pleading." Id. at 313.
90. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcucF (1938) 595.
91. See Radio Television Corp. v. Bartniew Dist. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 431 (S. D. N. Y.
1940); Gray v. Schoonmaker, 30 F. Supp. 1019 (E. D. Ill. 1940).
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the terms of Rule 9. The federal rules provide that it is an affirmative defense
which must be affirmatively set forth by the defendant. 92 Despite this pro-
cedural treatment of the burden of pleading contributory negligence by the
Supreme Court in formulating the rules an important question has arisen as
to whether the matter of pleading and proving freedom from contributory
negligence in a federal court is substantive or procedural where the jurisdiction
of the court is based on diversity of citizenship. The question arose in the
case of Francis v. Humphrey,93 where the court granted a motion to dismiss
the complaint for insufficiency because the plaintiff had failed to allege his
freedom from contributory negligence. The court had before it the question
of whether it should apply Rule 8 (c) of the federal rules or the law of the
state on pleading and proving contributory negligence under Erie v. Tompkins.9
4
The court concluded that the plaintiff's duty to plead freedom from contributory
negligence was part of the substantive law of the state9 5 and that it was, under
the Tompkins case, controlling.9 6 Much criticism has been leveled at this
decision upon the basis that it destroys the uniformity of procedure so desir-
ously achieved by the Federal Rules in formulation. 97 It is indeed representa-
tive of an enigma peculiarly characteristic in the law where perfection is had
in conception but imperfection is the result of application. Despite this criti-
cism, however, it now seems well established that where state law is applicable
and the burden of proof is there placed on one party such burden is a matter
of substantive law and cannot be shifted by application of the Federal Rules
of Procedure.9" In any event, where state law provides that the plaintiff must
92. FED. RuLES CIV. PROC. 8 (c), 28 U. S. C. A. following § 273 (c).
93. 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
94. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
95. To sustain this conclusion the court cited Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Inl. 259,
88 N. E. 651 (1909), and Cullen v. Higgins, 216 Ill. 78, 74 N. E. 698 (1905). Both of
these cases assert the plaintiff's duty to plead freedom from contributory negligence. It
is difficult to see how they control the conclusion that it is part of the substantive law
of that state, since the court, without going into the question of substance or procedure,
merely reiterates the rule that the plaintiff must plead freedom from contributory negligence.
96. In view of the court's determination that it was a matter of substance, Rule 8 (c)
could not control since it is provided by the authorizing statute that the federal rules
"shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." 48 STAT.
1064, 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (b).
97. See Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rides (1940) 1 F. R. D. 417;
Yankwich, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal District Courts (1940) 1 F. R. D.
453, 471; Comment (1939) 37 MIcH. L. REV. 1249; (1939) IowA L. REv. 609; (1939)
34 ILL. L. REv. 106. See also (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 375 which supports the conclusion
of the court.
98. Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938); Schopp v. Muller Dairies, Inc.,
25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y. 1938); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208 (1939),
revs'g 101 F (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (holding that burden of proof was a sub-
stantive matter). See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE (1940 Supp.) 571. For cases with a
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plead and prove his freedom from contributory negligence and the district
court has jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship the pleader will
insure his complaint against the successful attack of a motion to dismiss for
insufficient statement of a claim if he alleges freedom from contributory
negligence.
Conclusion
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is efficiency
and liberality in procedure, and more particularly, clarity and simplicity of
statement in pleading, 9  aas not been frustrated or sidetracked by the federal
courts.'0 0 The Rules, liberal in conception, have remained liberal in appli-
cation. While it is true that some of the district courts have adhered to a
common law policy of technicality and particularity, cases from the circuit
courts such as the Sierocinski,101 Sparks,0 2 and TahiI'03 cases, have forecast
the new liberality which should guide the judges' approach to the examination
of the complaint. If wisely and judicially administered this subordination of
craftsmanship in pleading to simplicity and conciseness in the statement of a
claim will ultimately effect a more just settlement of a grievance and will
eliminate the web of technicality surrounding the procedural aspect of the law
which has so often been decried by the lawyer and layman alike.
contrary approach to the question of substance and procedure see Guardian Life Ins. Co.
v. Glum, 106 F. (2d) 592,,595 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp.
(S. D. N. Y. 1938).
99. See note 4 supra.
100. Yankwich, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal District Courts (1940) 1
F. R. D. 453, 490.
101. 103 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
102. 113 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
103. 116 F. (2d) 865 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
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